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THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
IN PAROLE REVOCATION
I. Introduction
In recent years courts have shown more recognition of the rights
of parolees and probationers. Spurred by a Supreme Court decision'
that certain due process protections were applicable to parole revo-
cation procedures, revocation hearings are now providing parolees
and probationers some of the procedural protections available to
criminal defendants at trial. Policy considerations have dictated,
however, that the protections available at revocation hearings must
fall far short of conferring upon the accused "the full panoply of
rights due a defendant"2 at trial.
In Morrissey v. Brewer the Supreme Court held that the
protections of procedural due process should attach to a parole revo-
cation proceeding.' In so ruling the Court dismissed the argument
that a parolee's "liberty" was only conditional on good behavior,
and squarely held that deprivation of this liberty would constitute
a "grievous loss."5 Such a finding necessitated the imposition of at
least minimal due process protections. The Morrissey Court, how-
ever; emphasized the differences between a parole revocation hear-
ing and a full criminal proceeding! Influenced by a desire to keep
revocation hearings relatively informal,7 the Court balanced the in-
1. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)..
2. Id. at 480.
3. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). See Note, An Endorsement of Due Process Reform in Parole
Revocation: Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 LoYOLA U. L.A.L. REV. 157 (1973); 22 CATH. U. L. REV.
715 (1973).
4. The Court stated that there were two stages involved. First, when the parolee is ar-
rested, due process requires a preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists
to believe a parole violation has occurred. 408 U.S. at 485. The second stage requires the
parolee be given an opportunity for a hearing, to be held prior to the decision on revocation.
The Court set out the minimum requirements of due process as: (1) written notice of the
claimed violations; (2) disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (3) opportunity
to be heard; (4) a limited right to confront witnesses; (5) a neutral hearing body; and (6) a
written statement of reasons for the revocation. Id. at 487-89.
5. Id. at 482. The Court stated that it had rejected the concept of the right-privilege
distinction and that due process could be applied flexibly, providing the particular protec-
tions which a situation required. Id. at 481.
6. Id. at 480.
7. "[T~he interest of both State and parolee will be furthered by an effective but informal
hearing." Id. at 484-85.
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terests of "the parolee in his continued liberty", against the state's
interest in being able to return a parole violator "to imprisonment
without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial."' Less than a
year later, in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, ' the Court, after first stating that
it discerned no relevant differences between due process require-
ments for parole revocation and probation revocation," held that
the question of whether a parolee or probationer is entitled to coun-
sel at a revocation hearing was to be decided on a case by case
basis. 2 The Court again stressed that "there are critical differences
between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings,
and both society and the probationer or parolee have stakes in pre-
serving these differences."'"
As a result of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the difference
between revocation hearings and criminal proceedings, lower courts
have held that some constitutional protection available to defend-
ants at trial do not apply at revocation hearings. 4 Thus, the exclu-
sionary rule has been held inapplicable to revocation hearings. 5 In
8. Id. at 482.
9. Id. at 483.
10. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). See 6 CONN. L. REv. 559 (1974).
11. The Court stated:
Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution,
but does result in a loss of liberty. Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a
parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the condi-
tions specified in Morrissey v. Brewer ....
411 U.S. at 782 (footnotes omitted).
For the purposes of this discussion the terms "parolee" and "probationer" can be consid-
ered interchangeable.
12. Id. at 790-91. In 1942 the Court had held in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942)
that the question of whether an indigent defendant in a non-capital felony trial had a consti-
tutional right to have counsel appointed was to be determined on a case by case basis. In
1963 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) abandoned this approach and held
that in all felony cases an indigent defendant had a right to have counsel appointed for him.
This rule was later extended to cover all misdemeanor cases which involve the risk of potential
imprisonment. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
The Court in Gagnon declined to enunciate specifically those situations where due process
would require a parolee or probationer be granted the benefit of either appointed or retained
counsel. 411 U.S. at 790. The Court has held, however, that there is a right to counsel at a
post-trial proceeding combining revocation of probation and the imposition of a deferred
sentence. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
13. 411 U.S. at 788-89.
14. See text accompanying notes 26-55 infra.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975).
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contrast is a recent district court decision, Standlee v. Rhay,"
where it was held that because of the punitive nature of a revocation
hearing, it should be treated in some respects as equivalent to a
criminal proceeding. Therefore, the Standlee court held that collat-
eral estoppel barred re-litigation at a revocation hearing of an issue
decided in a prior criminal trial. 7 These contrasting results are not
as inconsistent as they may seem at first glance, but may be harmo-
nized, to some extent, through an analysis of the principles underly-
ing the respective doctrines. 8
II. The Exclusionary Rule in Revocation Hearings
The exclusionary rule had its origin in Weeks v. United States.'"
In essence the rule prohibited the use of illegally obtained evidence
in federal cases.2 In 1961 Mapp v. Ohio2' made the rule applicable
to state court proceedings. The primary philosophy behind the rule
is that exclusion of such evidence is necessary as a deterrent against
police officers' violations of the constitutional rights of individuals. 2
Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the exclusion-
16. No. C-75-18 (E.D. Wash., Nov. 7, 1975).
17. Id. at 17.
18. It has been stated that the special relationship of parolee and his parole officer grants
the officer considerable latitude in exercising control over the parolee. See United States ex
rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971). The exclusionary rule as now discussed, however, is specifi-
cally related to the situation where there has been a violation of the parolee's or probationer's
constitutional rights by police officers which, if the evidence gained thereby were offered at
trial, would result in the evidence being excluded. See U.S. CONST., amend. IV: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " The exclusionary rule also operates to
exclude statements by an accused obtained in the absence of Miranda warnings. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Usually the grounds upon which revocation of parole is sought will include several reasons.
See Wolin, After Release-The Parolee in Society, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1973). The
grounds for which a parolee or probationer faces a revocation hearing examined in this Note
consists exclusively of alleged criminal activity.
19. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
20. Id. at 398. The rule was specifically restricted to searches and seizures by federal
officers in violation of the fourth amendment. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223
(1960) extended the exclusion to illegal searches and seizures made by state officers when the
evidence was offered in federal courts.
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. An additional proffered justification for the exclusionary rule has been the doctrine
of the imperative of judicial integrity as announced in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960). See text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
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ary rule does not set out a constitutional right of the accused, but
is a judicial standard imposed to encourage observance of constitu-
tional rights.23 Consequently, in those situations where no deterrent
effect can be served by exclusion of the evidence the rule should not
apply. In United States v. Calandra4 the Court stated:25
[T]he exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of
illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As with any
remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.
Generally, courts have refused to apply the exclusionary rule to
probation and parole revocation hearings." This attitude is typified
by State v. Caron,27 a case involving a probationer who was arrested
and charged with "breaking and entering with intent to commit
larceny."2 At trial the defendant moved to suppress the evidence
of the alleged stolen articles seized by the police.2" The motion was
granted on the ground that the police had acted without probable
cause. The prosecutor then moved to dismiss the indictment and
the motion was granted. At the subsequent probation revocation
hearing, the defendant moved to suppress the same evidence on the
same grounds.'" The presiding judge3 denied the motion. 32 The
23. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). See generally Cole, The
Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation Proceedings: Some Observations on
Deterrence and the "Imperative of Judicial Integrity," 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 21 (1975).
24. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
25. Id. at 348.
26. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Farmer, 512
F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F.
Supp. 648 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971);
In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851
(1970); People v. Dowery, No. 46890 (I1., Nov. 25, 1975); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me.
1975); Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A.2d 647 (1973); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa.
102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973). Contra, Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399 (Okl. Cr. App. 1973)
involving the interpretation of a state statute. See generally Cole, note 23 supra.
27. 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975).
28. Id. at 496.
29. The dissenting judge raised the possibility that, because the trial had begun, the
doctrines of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel might be involved in the subsequent
revocation hearing, but since the matter was not raised affirmatively there was no need for
decision on that point. Id. at 500 n.1 (Dufresne, C.J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 497. Although this was prior to the decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), Maine already had a statute requiring a revocation hearing before revoking proba-
tion. Act of Oct. 31, 1957, ch. 428, § 4, [19571 Me. Laws Spec. Sess. 16 (now ME. REv. STAT.
19761 NOTES
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held there were no policy objec-
tives to be served by extending the exclusionary rule to probation
or parole revocation hearings.33 The court agreed with prior deci-
sions that the policy of deterrence implicit in the rule was amply
served by exclusion at trial. It concluded that any incidental deter-
rence fostered by exclusion at the revocation hearing was far out-
weighed by the state's interest in keeping the hearing informal and
efficient. 34 In United States v. Winsett 5 the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit also found that the value of any additional
deterrence was minimal. 31
Application of the exclusionary rule to the probation revocation proceeding
in this case would achieve a deterrent effect speculative or marginal at best.
Whatever deterrence of police misconduct results from the exclusion of ille-
gally seized evidence from criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that
application of the rule to probation revocation proceedings would
significantly further that goal.
In In re Martinez37 the California Supreme Court emphasized the
possible dangers to society of allowing a parolee to remain at large
when evidence has been discovered that he has again become in-
volved in criminal activity.38 In that case Martinez's parole was
revoked after he was arrested, charged, and convicted of possession
of heroin."9 Conviction on this charge was subsequently reversed on
ANN. tit. 17-A §§ 1205-06 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975)).
31. This was the same judge who presided at the earlier trial. 334 A.2d at 497. Under the
Maine statute, revocation hearings were held in Superior Court. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, §§ 1205-06 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975).
32. 334 A.2d at 497.
33. Id. at 499.
34. Id. The court also held that the constitutional right of confrontation of witnesses did
not preclude the use of hearsay evidence at the revocation hearing. Id. at 498. A revocation
hearing is not a stage of a criminal proceeding and there is no reason for a "transposition to
the proceeding of the entire body of evidentiary rules" applicable at trial. Id.; see United
States v. Miller, 514 F.2d 41, 43 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 1218, 1221
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 1008 (1971).
35. 518 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 54.
37. 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
38. Id. at 650, 463 P.2d at 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
39. Id. at 644, 463 P.2d at 736, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 384. The grounds listed for the revocation
included, in addition to the new conviction, driving without permission from his parole officer
and excessive drinking. The court here, however, was deciding solely on the propriety of the
Adult Authority having based its finding partially on evidence obtained through an illegal
search. Id.
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appeal because the fruits of an illegal search had been used at trial."
The charges were eventually dismissed." The parole authority nev-
ertheless refused to restore Martinez to his parole status. The Su-
preme Court of California decided that the evidence" that had been
excluded at trial in deciding whether Martinez had engaged in ille-
gal conduct justified revocation of parole. The court agreed that
extending the exclusionary rule to parole revocation hearings would
further deter police officers from violating constitutional rights.
However, it termed the effect of this increase to be "slight"4 and
found the social consequences of excluding the evidence to be "dis-
astrous."44 Application of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation
hearings would pose "a risk of danger to the public which ...
outweighs the competing considerations of a problematical gain in
deterrence.""
In addition to finding a risk to the public in extending the exclu-
sionary rule to revocation hearings, courts have concluded that such
an extension would interfere with the parole board's function of
guiding the parolee's rehabilitation and re-adjustment into so-
ciety.4" In United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick47 the court
indicated that application of the exclusionary rule to parole revoca-
tion proceedings "would tend to obstruct the parole system in ac-
complishing its remedial purposes."4 Moreover, the Sperling court
noted the existence of federal and state statutory penalties that
could be imposed on police officers for violating an individual's
40. People v. Martinez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 796, 43 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1965).
41. 1 Cal. 3d. at 644, 463 P.2d at 736, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
42. The evidence in question involved both evidence gained from an unconstitutional
search, and a confession that was improperly obtained. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 650, 463 P.2d at 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The dissent argued that the social
consequences of excluding illegally gained evidence in revocation hearings would be no greater
than the consequences of excluding it at trial. Id. at 657, 463 P.2d at 745, 83 Cal. Rptr. at
393 (Peters, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 650, 463 P.2d at 740, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
46. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51,54 (9th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel.
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Lombardino
v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648, 651 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 880 (1971).
47. 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
48. Id. at 1163-64.
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constitutional rights." Although the Supreme Court in Mapp v.
Ohio50 had found such penalties to be an insufficient deterrent
against illegal police actions to gain evidence for use at a trial, the
Sperling court reasoned that it had not yet been shown that such
penalties would be ineffective in the context of revocation hear-
ings.5"
The exclusionary rule has also been supported by the argument
that courtroom use of illegally obtained evidence would be a viola-
tion of the imperative of judicial integrity. 52 In rejecting this argu-
ment, as applied to revocation proceedings, one court indicated that
several Supreme Court decisions53 have sustained limited courtroom
use of illegally obtained evidence in certain circumstances. Thus
this "imperative" was "not an ironclad principle."5
The primary reservation expressed by some courts when declining
to apply the exclusionary rule to revocation hearings is the possibil-
ity of police harassment of parolees and probationers .5 These courts
have indicated that a showing of such deliberate harassment would
tip the balance in favor of excluding the evidence.
49. Id. at 1164 n.10. The statutes referred to by the court are 18 U.S.C. § § 242, 2236 (1970);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.00 (McKinney 1975).
50. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. 426 F.2d at 1164. The court suggested that if these penalties were to be found ineffec-
tive it would be sounder policy to strengthen the penalties than "to vitiate the penological
effectiveness of the Parole Board through the imposition of an inflexible exclusionary rule."
Id.
52. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817,
840 (7th Cir. 1971) (Fairchild, J., dissenting); In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 652, 463 P.2d
734, 742, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390 (Peters, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 851 (1970).
53. The Supreme Court has held use of illegally obtained evidence permissible for pur-
poses of grand jury proceedings in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See also
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (admissible for impeachment purposes); United
States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971) (use is
permissible at sentencing proceedings).
54. People v. Dowery, 20 II. App. 3d 738, 743, 312 N.E.2d 682, 686 (1974).
55. See United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426
F.2d 1161, 1166 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring); United States ex rel. Lombardino
v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648, 651 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 880 (1971).
Chief Judge Lumbard in Sperling indicated that:
The time may come when the balance will shift. Proof of widespread police harass-
ment of parolees would cause such a shift since the exclusionary rule is a deterrent
which should be used when the need for deterrence is clearly shown.
426 F.2d at 1166.
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III. Collateral Estoppel in Revocation Hearings
In refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to revocation hearings,
courts have emphasized the difference between these hearings and
criminal trials. In contrast, Standlee v. Rhay bases its application
of the collateral estoppel doctrine on the similar nature of revocation
hearings and criminal proceedings.5" Standlee held that where the
question of the truth of the defendant's alibi had been decided in
his favor at a criminal trial, the state could not relitigate the issue
at a subsequent revocation hearing."
The phrase "collateral estoppel" was defined in Ashe v. Swenson"
as meaning "that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again
be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit."59 In the
context of revocation hearings it has been asserted that this doctrine
bars a parole board or similar authority from examining, as the basis
for revoking parole, the question of a parolee's participation in a
crime once he has been acquitted at trial of committing that crime."
Collateral estoppel traces its conceptual basis to the constitu-
tional guarantee against double jeopardy.6 However, collateral
estoppel 2 only works to block relitigation of an issue, 3 while the
prohibition of double jeopardy bars the entire cause of action.64 Nev-
ertheless, preclusion of an issue by virtue of the prior criminal judg-
ment may effectively bar any subsequent revocation action. 5
In Ashell four participants in a card game were robbed by a group
56. No. C-75-18, at 15-16 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 1975).
57. Id. at 16.
58. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
59. Id. at 443.
60. See, e.g., Standlee v. Rhay, No. C-75-18 (E.D. Wash., Nov. 7, 1975); People v. Gray-
son, 58 I1. 2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43 (1974).
61. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 445 (1970).
62. The doctrine will apply only when there has been a final judgment. 1B J. MOORE,
FEDERAL. PRACTICE ] 0.441[21 (2d ed. 1974); 5 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK
Civil, PRACTICE 5011.28 (1975).
63. McDonald v. O'Meara, 473 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973); see
United States ex. rel. Fidtler v. Hendrick, 411 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1969); Glass v. United States
Rubber Co., 382 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1967).
64. IB J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418[21 (2d ed. 1974); 5 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN
& A. MIILILER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 5011.24 (1975).
65. This is so where an essential element of the second action cannot be asserted because
the prior action conclusively determined an issue adversely to the state.
66. 398 U.S. 436 (1970).
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of men at gunpoint. Ashe was brought to trial on the charge of
robbing one of the other participants in the game. Three of the card
players were unable to identify Ashe as one of the robbers. The
fourth player identified Ashe, but only on the basis of a similarity
in height and weight. The jury found this evidence insufficient and
acquitted Ashe. The state subsequently convicted Ashe for the rob-
bery of another of the card game participants. After the Supreme
Court of Missouri affirmed the conviction, 7 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the jury in Ashe's first trial had determined
that Ashe was not one of the robbers.As This determination was
binding on the state in the second prosecution. Although the charge
was different, the state could not relitigate the issue of whether the
defendant had been one of the participants in the robbery."
Generally where one party in a civil action seeks to preclude from
litigation an issue decided in a prior criminal proceeding, the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel does not apply." Some courts7 have not
applied the doctrine where the government7" brings a subsequent
civil action73 against a party acquitted in a prior criminal proceed-
67. State v. Ashe, 350 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1961).
68. 397 U.S. at 446.
69. Id.
70. Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19
VAND. L. REV. 683, 701-16 (1966). A primary reason for not giving preclusive effect to
issues in this situation is that the standard of proof is different in the two proceedings. This
is an especially important consideration where the defendant was acquitted in the prior
criminal proceeding.
When a jury acquits, it decides only that an accused is not proven guilty of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Commissioner is not foreclosed thereby
from attempting to show fraud in the civil counterpart against the same defendant by
a fair preponderance of the evidence . . . . This burden of proof factor alone is suffi-
cient to demonstrate that the "bundle of legal principles" applicable in a civil suit
differs significantly from that in a criminal trial.
Neaderland v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
71. See Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1953).
72. Since it is the government which brings the subsequent civil suit, this satisfies any
objection to application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on lack of identity of the
parties. See generally 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.411 (2d ed. 1974).
73. The situation described here can arise in a civil action to fix a penalty in a tax case
after a prior acquittal of a criminal charge of willful evasion of income tax. See, e.g., Helvering
v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Neaderland v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970). It can also arise in cases where the government institutes an
action for condemnation or forfeiture of property alleged to be the subject matter or instru-
ment of a crime after the defendant has been acquitted of the crime. See, e.g., One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
1976]
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ing. Other courts have drawn a distinction based on the nature of
the sanction sought. These courts have held that collateral estoppel
bars relitigation of an issue in a subsequent government civil suit
where the sanction sought is punitive in nature, but the doctrine will
not apply where the sanction sought is merely remedial.74
The district court in Standlee relied heavily on this distinction in
concluding that because of the punitive nature of revocation hear-
ings, a prior acquittal in a criminal trial must have preclusive effect
in a subsequent revocation hearing."5
Standlee was on parole when he was arrested for an alleged ab-
duction with intent to rape. A parole revocation hearing was com-
menced and was continued pending the outcome of the trial on the
new charges."6 At trial Standlee was acquitted of all charges with
the trial judge stating that the persuasive testimony of an alibi
witness had been the decisive factor in the defendant's favor.7 Sub-
sequently the Parole Board reconvened the revocation hearing and
considered the same evidence which had been presented at trial."
The hearing officer found Standlee guilty of the charges by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence." As a result of his involvement in the
crime, Standlee was re-incarcerated for violating his parole condi-
tions. 0 The denial of Standlee's writ of habeas corpus was affirmed
by the Washington Supreme Court.8
The federal district court, in a habeas corpus proceeding, over-
turned the state court decision. The court analogized the situation
74. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436
(1886); Neaderland v. Commissioner, 424 F.2d 639 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970).
The Supreme Court has held constitutional criminal safeguards applicable to forfeiture suits
where the sanction sought is punitive in nature. See United States v. United States Coin and
Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693
(1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
75. No. C-75-18, at 14.
76. Id. at 1.
77. Standlee's alibi witness testified that Standlee was with her in Portland the night the
crime was committed in Seattle. Id. at 2.
78. The alibi witness did not appear in person. Instead, the transcript of her testimony
was read. Id. Standlee also asserted that he was denied equal protection of the laws because
of his inability to pay the travel costs of his alibi witness in order to enable her to testify in
person at the hearing. Id. at 3. The court found it unnecessary to reach this claim. Id. at 17.
79. Id. at 2.
80. Id.
81. Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 721 (1974).
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to Coffey v. United States.2 Coffey had held that a prior acquittal
in a criminal case was res judicatal3 and barred a subsequent forfei-
ture suit, punitive in nature, brought by the government based on
the same alleged criminal activity. 4 The Standlee court reasoned
that the act of revocation was equally punitive 5 and that the pro-
ceeding was "quasi-criminal '"88 in nature. The court noted:87
[W]hile the parole revocation procedure has retained its civil label, the
parolee has increasingly enjoyed the rights of a defendant in a criminal trial,
albeit in a modified form. The existence of such constitutional protections is
itself indicative of the punitive nature of the proceeding. . . . The Supreme
Court [in Morrissey] plainly did not characterize revocation of parole as a
remedial sanction, but rather emphasized the grievousness of the loss in-
flicted ....
The court also emphasized that the revocation hearing here was
"imbued . . . with the aura of a criminal trial," 8 with the defen-
dant represented by counsel and the State by the Attorney General,
and with the parole board assuming a role "'more akin to that of a
judge at a trial.' " The district court stated:89
Under these circumstances the State cannot be allowed to rely on the differ-
ent labels attached to the two proceedings to justify their action, which in
any other context would constitute a gross violation of the collateral estoppel
doctrine.
Therefore, the court held, Standlee's acquittal of the charges at
trial must be considered as binding at the revocation hearing. 0
The Standlee court's characterization of revocation hearings as
quasi-criminal in nature appears to be inconsistent with the nature
of these hearings as perceived by the courts which have refused to
apply the exclusionary rule." Standlee emphasized similarities be-
82. 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
83. It is not completely clear whether the doctrine employed by the court was that of res
judicata or collateral estoppel. See 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.418[3] at 2855 n.13
(2d ed. 1974).
84. 116 U.S. at 443.
85. No. C-75-18, at 14.
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id. at 16.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 17.
91. See text accompanying notes 26-55 supra.
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tween revocation hearings and criminal proceedings while the exclu-
sionary rule cases emphasized differences. More fundamentally, the
exclusionary rule decisions showed a reluctance to bind the hearing
body with procedural restraints while Standlee chose to apply the
restraint of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Both these views have
employed language from Morrissey."2 The weighing test used by
the Morrissey Court balanced the interests of the state against
the interests of the parolee.9" The decisions in Standlee and the
exclusionary rule cases are outgrowths of the approach taken in
Morrissey.
Although these two views have different perceptions as to the
nature of the revocation hearings, they are not directly conflicting.
The Standlee decision limits itself expressly to those situations
"where the Parole Board deliberately accedes to the criminal prose-
cution."94 The court states that in all other circumstances the hear-
ing body can continue to use its flexible procedures, including the
lax rules of evidence and the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard of proof.9
Nevertheless, there are some serious practical problems. As the
Court in Morrissey indicated, law authorities often prefer the revo-
cation procedure to bringing a parolee or probationer to trial on a
new charge. The revocation procedure is faster, cheaper, and less
complex, and the standard of proof required is lower. Thus, it is
utilized if the new offense is not serious enough for the authorities
to prefer a trial or if there is considerable time left to be served on
the parolee's or probationer's original sentence. In addition, where
the exclusionary rule would prevent important evidence from being
92. The exclusionary rule cases have emphasized the language in Morrissey that "the
revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution. ... Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 480 (1972). See United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1975); People
v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 876-77 n.8, 533 P.2d 1024, 1033 n.8, Cal. Rptr. 384, 393 n.8
(1975); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495, 497 (Me. 1975); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 P.2d 102,
118, 305 A.2d 701, 710 (1973). In contrast, Standlee emphasizes the "grievous loss" that the
Supreme Court stated a parolee suffers when his parole is revoked. Standlee v. Rhay, No. C-
75-18, at 14 (E.D. Wash., Nov. 7, 1975), citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
93. 408 U.S. at 482-84.
94. No. C-75-18, at 17.
95. Id. See also People v. Grayson, 58 I1. 2d 260, 264-65, 319 N.E.2d 43, 45 (1974).
96. 408 U.S. at 479. See also In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 653, 463 P.2d 734, 742, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 382, 390 (1970) (Peters, J., dissenting).
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available at trial, the inclination to bring a revocation hearing is
even greater.
The rationale of the Standlee case appears to provide an addi-
tional incentive to postpone the trial where the state believes it may
not be able to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the
alleged crime is the only parole violation asserted. The result of such
procedure is clear. The parolee may be punished for a crime which
the state could not prove in a court of law. The protection of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt has been obviated.
Although the punishment is conceptually based on the individ-
ual's original conviction and sentence, the parolee is actually being
punished for a wholly unrelated new offense, and is accorded treat-
ment different from a non-parolee solely because of his original
conviction and his parolee status.
Judge Utter, who dissented in the state supreme court decision
in Standlee v. Smith," argued that under the circumstances of the
case, the evidence in favor of revocation should meet the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard of proof. 8 This approach, like the one
taken in the federal district court in Standlee v. Rhay,"1 is basically
grounded on the view of the revocation proceeding as a punitive
sanction.
IV. Conclusion
Although revocation hearings often present both exclusionary rule
and collateral estoppel problems, these are essentially distinct legal
concepts. The exclusionary rule is an artificial construct aimed not
at achieving a full trial of the merits, but at suppressing otherwise
probative evidence in the hope of deterring infringements on
constitutional rights. In the context of revocation hearings, the de-
terrence theory becomes tenuous.
In contrast, the collateral estoppel doctrine, in terms of criminal
proceedings, traces its conceptual basis to the constitutional guar-
97. 83 Wash. 2d 405, 410, 518 P.2d 721, 724 (1974) (Utter, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 414, 518 P.2d at 726.
99. No. C-75-18, at 10-11. One area left unresolved by the court in Standlee is the situa-
tion where the government deliberately avoids giving the parolee the benefit of a criminal
trial and seeks to imprison him by virtue of the revocation hearing alone. A further considera-
tion involved is that a requirement of a guilty verdict at a criminal trial prior to revocation
of parole would give the parolee the benefit of the exclusionary rule and the other protections
which courts have found not to apply to revocation hearings.
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antee against double jeopardy. Whether this justifies giving preclu-
sive effect to issues raised during a criminal trial in a subsequent
revocation hearing depends on the particular situation. One factor
to be considered is whether the exclusionary rule had been used at
trial. If evidence which may have been determinative on a certain
issue were excluded at trial, that issue should not be precluded from
reconsideration at the parole or probation hearing. However, if the
state has had an opportunity to present all its evidence at the trial,
the court should generally recognize that issue as finally determined
and binding in a subsequent revocation hearing. In such a case the
revocation hearing is bound by the same standard of proof as ap-
plied at the trial. This appears to be justified, however, since the
issue involved is whether the accused has committed a criminal act
and thus may face imprisonment, either through the revocation of
his parole or the imposition of a new sentence.
I Patrick M. Reilly
